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Economists have been concerned that sovereign communities may distort environmental 
policies to attract mobile capital.  This paper provides something of a challenge to this idea.  
It does so by extending the model of Oates and Schwab (1988) to allow the supply of capital 
to a state, whether acting independently or strategically as part of a federation, to be less than 
perfectly elastic due to capital market imperfections.  This gives the state an incentive to 
distort its policies in order to manipulate its domestic capital price relative to the given world 
return for capital.  The key result is to show that the state always prefers to use a dedicated 
capital tax to achieve its desired domestic price, leaving environmental standards at efficient 
levels.  Only when the state is denied access to a capital tax will it resort to distorting 
environmental standards.  Thus, distortions to environmental standards arise from restrictions 
on the set of policy instruments rather than non-cooperative behavior or capital mobility per 
se, at least when the incentive to distort policy arises from capital market imperfections. 
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1. Introduction 
Academics have been concerned that sovereign communities acting as independent 
countries or jurisdictions in federations distort environmental policies to attract firms, 
labor and capital, engaging in a race to the bottom.  This was expressed by Cumberland 
(1979, 1981) though Oates and Schwab (1988) were the earliest to examine the idea 
formally.  These authors developed a model of small communities each with two 
instruments, a capital tax and environmental policy.  A fixed stock of capital migrates 
freely across communities and in equilibrium any particular community takes the 
community-wide return as given: communities face a perfectly competitive capital 
market.  Oates and Schwab show that majority rule voting leads to efficient 
environmental standards and a zero tax on capital.  They also examine cases where the 
community’s choices are sub-optimal.  From this paper a race to the bottom literature has 
emerged2.  Depending on the models used this literature generates race to the bottom (or 
top) results, perpetuating the idea that environmental standards are distorted if 
communities choose policies in the presence of capital or firm mobility.    
 The purpose of this paper is to provide something of a challenge to this notion.  It 
does this by showing that distortions to environmental standards arise from restrictions on 
the set of policy instruments rather than non-cooperative behavior or capital mobility per 
se at least when the incentive to distort policy arises from inelastic capital supply.  The 
paper demonstrates this by extending the Oates and Schwab model to a world in which a 
(small) community faces a market for mobile capital that is imperfectly competitive.  This 
yields an incentive for a community to distort policies in order to manipulate the 
domestic capital price, even though the world return to capital is given.  The key insight 
is to show that such distortions only eventuate when the policy vector is restricted, and in 
particular, if the community has no capital tax.  In this instance, environmental standards 
are distorted relative to efficient levels, as is commonly found.  However, such a race 
never eventuates if the community’s policy vector includes a capital tax.  In this case, the 
community always prefers to use the tax to manipulate its capital price, rather than distort 
environmental policy.  This is shown to hold whether the community is an independent 
                                               
2 For a survey see Wilson (1996), Wellisch (2000) and Oates (2002).  Recent examples of race to the 
bottom papers include Kunce and Shogren (2005, 2006). 
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country or a state in a federation.  As long as the policy vector is unrestricted there is no 
evidence that welfare maximizing communities facing an imperfectly competitive capital 
market, and hence incentives to distort policies in order to influence prices, engage in any 
race to the bottom (or top).   
 The intuition for this insight is as follows.  Distorting environmental policy to 
influence the domestic capital price when capital is imperfectly mobile yields a similar 
benefit for the community as changing the capital tax, but at a higher cost in terms of 
utility foregone.  Thus, it is less costly to use the capital tax to exploit imperfections in 
the capital market to manipulate the domestic capital price, leaving environmental policy 
at efficient levels.  If the community chooses policies to maximize household welfare it 
will want to use the least cost policy instrument to achieve its aims with respect to the 
favored domestic capital price.  But if this least cost policy instrument is removed from 
the set of feasible policies the community uses the next lowest cost instrument - 
distortions to environmental standards - to manipulate the domestic capital price.  It is in 
this case only that environmental standards are distorted.       
 The model developed initially is one of a single community that can be thought of 
as a country3.  Domestic households own firms and the government has two instruments, 
a per-unit capital tax and environmental emissions.  Output is a function of emissions and 
the total capital supply while emissions also directly affect household utility.  Capital 
imperfections are introduced using a function in which the supply of capital to the 
community can be perfectly inelastic, a non-decreasing function of the (net) domestic 
capital price relative to the given outside (world) return, or perfectly inelastic.  The 
outside (world) return to capital is given.  The community’s government is benevolent 
and selects policies to maximize household utility while taking account of feasibility and 
the impact of its decisions on the supply of capital.  The main result is derived using the 
first order conditions from the government’s optimization problem.     
   The single community model is then extended to a multi-state model to capture 
the case of strategic game playing states within a federation who levy a capital tax and 
provide environmental standards.  It is shown that the efficient environmental policy 
result holds in this setting as well.  This conclusion is placed into the context of the race 
                                               
3 The single country model is presented first because the result is clearest in this case.   
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to the bottom literature with the implication that game playing states do not engage in any 
race to the bottom or top if they can tax capital.  Therefore, if a single community 
(country) facing an imperfectly competitive capital market uses the tax to manipulate its 
domestic capital price while providing efficient environmental standards then so too will 
states acting strategically in a federation.  Non-cooperative behavior per se has no 
qualitative impact on the central idea that environmental standards are efficient if 
countries, or states within federations, have a policy vector that includes a capital tax.                        
 The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 develops the model for the single 
community.  Section 3 derives the first order necessary conditions for the tax and 
emissions standards.  The key efficiency results are derived in section 4.  The two-state 
model is developed in section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
    
2. A single community 
The first model considered is of a single community (e.g. country) with H immobile 
(domestic) households and an industry producing output  y ≥ 0  using two inputs, mobile 
capital  k  and un-priced pollutant emissions g .  Emissions are a public bad (the inverse 
of environmental standards) chosen directly by the government and output is    
( , )y f k g= .        (1) 
The price of output is assumed to be one so (1) also defines the value of output.  The 
marginal product of capital and emissions are positive, hence 0kf >  and 0gf >  where 
0kkf <  and 0ggf < .  The domestic return to capital is just the marginal product     
 
 fk = r(k,g) .        (2) 
Here ( , ) 0kr k g <  and ( , ) 0gr k g > . 
 The community has a second policy instrument, a per unit source-based capital 
tax denoted as  t .  This could also be modeled as an ad valorem tax but the results are 
clearer with a per-unit tax.4  The per unit (net) domestic return to capital is   
 ( , )x r k g t= − .        (3) 
                                               
4 The result with an ad-valorem tax is available on request.   
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 The total supply of mobile capital to the community is a monotonically non-




 =  
 
.        (4) 
Consistent with many tax competition models the supply of capital to the community is 
the result of an equilibrating rule where the world return ω  is given and not affected by 
the community’s policies.  In contrast to the usual approach, where the supply of capital 
to the community is also perfectly elastic at the given world return, (4) implies that the 
community can face a capital supply curve that is (i) perfectly inelastic (vertical); (ii) 
upward sloping; or (iii) perfectly inelastic (horizontal).  Hence, the more standard model 
is a special case of (4) where the supply curve is horizontal.  By allowing other capital 
market structures, especially (ii), equation (4) captures the possibility of imperfections in 
the capital market.  As noted, this possibility provides the community an incentive to use 
its policies to influence its net capital price, while taking the world return as given.5    
 A simplification of (4) makes the presentation simpler, namely, that the world 
return is fixed at one.  With this the capital supply function (4) becomes 
  k = k(x) .        (5) 
This still allows for the three capital supply curves discussed above.  Any particular 
capital supply curve for the community is now conditional on 1ω = .  The supply curve 
shifts up and down depending on the value of the world return.  Normalizing the world 
return at one makes no difference to the qualitative conclusions since the key relationship 
between x , the domestic capital price and k , capital supply, is retained in (5).  
 The community’s immobile households have identical incomes and preferences 
so the analysis can proceed from the perspective of a representative household who 
consumes a private good  X  and the public bad.  The utility function for the household is  
 ( , )U X g .        (6) 
Here 0XU > , 0XXU ≤ , 0gU <  and 0ggU ≤ .   
                                               
5 A perfectly inelastic capital supply might arise if the country’s borders are closed using capital controls.  
The capital supply curve can be upward sloping if capital has attachment to home or faces transactions 
costs when moving across borders.  The perfectly elastic case arises for capital which has zero attachment 
and no transactions costs.  The specification of (4) allows for all possibilities. 
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   Households are residual claimants and total household income is ( , )f k g x k−  
implying that all mobile capital is foreign owned.  Consumption per household is6  
 
( , )f k g x kX
H
−
= .       (7) 









.       (8) 
 Let the government be benevolent7 and represent the interests of households.  
Foreign owners of imported capital are disenfranchised.  Since households own all 
domestic firms this implies that government, household and firm interests coincide.  The 
government chooses  t  and  g  to maximize (8) while taking account of the capital supply 
effects of its decisions.  It has an incentive to use its policies to manipulate the terms on 
which capital is purchased from the outside.  From (8) it is clear that  x  affects the utility 
of households and from (3)  x  can be manipulated by the choice of g and t. 
 Since the model is of a single community with an imperfectly competitive supply 
curve for mobile capital there is no consideration of other communities (countries) or the 
manner in which capital migrates between communities to satisfy any equal return 
condition, as there is in many tax competition papers, including Oates and Schwab.  As 
will be shown below, the main results of the paper can be obtained in the single country 
case without any need to model a system of communities.  That said the model is 
extended in Section 4 to allow for multiple states within a federation where capital flows 
freely between states but the federation faces a capital supply function analogous to (5). 
    
3. First order necessary conditions 
Whether the potential to manipulate the domestic capital price translates into distortions 
to environmental standards is now examined.  This is accomplished by examining the 
first order necessary conditions, initially for the tax and then for emissions. 
                                               
6 Thus the community is thought of as a net importer of foreign owned capital.  Note that the specification 
at (7) also implies that revenue from the capital tax on the foreign owned capital is returned lump sum to 
households.  
7 This assumption allows one to focus on the potential for imperfections in the capital market to induce 
policy distortions without other sources of inefficiency such as states acting malevolently being present.   
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 The first order necessary condition for the tax is    
 0k





.       (9) 












.       (10) 





 in (9) is positive.  This is the increased gross payment that 
must be made to all units of capital in the economy as a result of its higher return that is 
in turn caused by the reduced capital supply with a higher tax.  The community perceives 





 is the revenue lost from the capital that 
leaves in response to a higher tax - also a cost - while k  captures the higher revenue 
received on the remaining capital base as the tax increases - a benefit.  Hence, (9) can be 
expressed as an equality of marginal benefit and marginal cost  











.       (11) 
 An expression for the optimal tax can be derived to see how the different capital 
supply elasticity possibilities discussed previously translate into the tax choice.  This is 
important for placing the main result about the efficiency of environmental policy into 






= .        (12) 
Next define ( )/xk k xε=  where  0 ≤ ε ≤ ∞  is the elasticity of capital supply, assumed to 







.        (13)   
 The different capital market structures alluded to after equation (4) can now be 
characterized more formally.  First when  ε = 0  the community’s capital market is closed 
to the world and  t* = r  from (13).  It is optimal to set a tax that appropriates all capital 
income so  x = r − t  and the (net) domestic capital price is zero.  Second as ε → ∞  the 
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community’s capital supply becomes perfectly elastic.   Here the capital supply curve is 







 as ε →∞ .     
One can also see that * 0t →  as ε →∞  and the optimal tax approaches zero.  Recalling 
that  x = r − t  the net domestic capital price approaches its marginal product ( x → r ).  It 
is also the case that the domestic capital price must approach the given world price ω  for 
equilibrium to exist.8  This is the case adopted in the standard tax competition models 
(e.g. Oates and Schwab) where capital is perfectly mobile, the optimal tax is zero and the 
domestic capital price is equal to the given world return.  One can see this is a special 
case of the more general capital model.  If  0 < ε < ∞  the capital supply curve is an 
increasing function of the domestic capital price, the tax is non-zero and defined at (13).  
 Hence, the optimal capital tax deployed by the single community depends upon 
the exact nature of the capital market it faces.  The most interesting case is the 
‘intermediate’ one where epsilon is greater than zero but not infinite since this is the case 
most likely to arise in a world where capital is attached to home or has transactions costs 
and is not perfectly free to move across national boundaries.  
 The first order necessary condition for emissions is      
 0g g k g
X
U k kH f r k t r k
U g g
∂ ∂
+ − + − =
∂ ∂
.     (14) 

























 in (14) is the marginal rate of substitution between g and 
X  summed across all households.  Since g is a public bad this is equivalent to the 
marginal cost of g in terms of foregone household utility.  The term gf  is the marginal 






 is the decline in the 
payment made to the existing capital base as g and consequently k  increases.  This is a 
                                               
8 The demonstration of this is available on request. 
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 is the increase in tax revenue that results 
from a larger tax base as g increases for a given t  (a marginal benefit) while  
rgk  is the 
increased payment to capital as more g increases capital’s productivity; this is a marginal 
cost since 0gr > . Hence, the first order necessary condition for emissions can be 







Ukf r k t r k H
g U
∂
− − = −
∂
  .     (16)
 
 For emissions to be efficient (16) should be a Samuelson condition since 
emissions are a public bad.  At first sight this is unlikely because of the distorting capital 
response terms.  They are present because policy choices affect the net domestic capital 
price, capital supply and household welfare.  Thus, if a community can use its policies to 
manipulate its capital price it seems that it may distort environmental standards.        
 
4. The provision of environmental standards 
It is now shown that this is not the case. When one takes the tax into account the first 
order necessary condition for emissions collapses to a Samuelson condition.  
 
4.1 Two instruments (tax and emissions) 
From (10) and (15) the following relationship between capital supply responses to a 







.        (17)  
The only factor that differentiates the capital supply responses to a change in each policy 
instrument is gr  the partial derivative that expresses how the gross domestic return 
responds to an increase in emissions.  In the event that 1gr =  the effect of an incremental 
increase in emissions (on capital supply) is identical to the effect of a one-unit decrease in 
the tax.  This might happen fortuitously but in general the capital supply effects resulting 
from changes in the two policy instruments will differ, though they remain related 
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through (17).  If 1gr <  the impact of a one-unit increase in g is smaller than the effect of 
a one-unit decrease in the tax and if 1gr >  then the opposite is true.       
 The different impact of each instrument on the net capital price, and hence capital 
supply, arises from the form of the capital price function, ( , )x r k g t= − .  Specifically, 
emissions directly enhance output, and hence g is an argument of ( , )r k g , whereas t does 
not.  However, the tax influences ( , )r k g  only indirectly through k, though it does affect 
x directly, and linearly, through the term t−  because it is a unit tax.  If not for these 
differential impacts arising from the form of the price equation the two instruments 
would be perfect substitutes in terms of their impact on the capital price and supply.9 
 The key result is now presented in the following theorem and proof: 
 
Theorem 1: If the government chooses the tax and emissions levels to satisfy the first 
order necessary conditions (9) and (14) then environmental policy is always efficient. 
        
Proof: Using (17) in (16) and multiplying through by 1/ gr  the first order condition for 
emissions can be expressed in terms of the tax capital supply responses as follows    
 
( )1 1gg k
g X g
Ukf r k t k H
r t U r
∂
+ − = −
∂
.     (18) 
The first term on the right side of (18) is equivalent to the left side of the tax first order 
necessary condition (11) while the second and third terms on the left side of (18) are 
equivalent to the right side of (11).  Furthermore, in equilibrium the left side of (11) must 
be equal to the right side of (11). This implies cancellation of the first term on the right 
side of (18) with the second and third terms on the left side of (18) and the first order 








= − .        (19)   
                                               
9 If the tax is ad valorem the two instruments still have a different impact on the net capital price and are 
not perfect substitutes.  Again, this is due to the fact that they each enter the price function differently.  
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This is a Samuelson condition where gf  is the social marginal benefit of emissions 
(higher output) and the right side is the social marginal cost in terms of household utility 
foregone.// 
 
The theorem and proof hold only if the community levies an optimal tax on 
capital since the result relies on the tax first order condition leading to a cancelation of 
the ‘distorting’ terms in (18).  If a tax consistent with equation (13) is implemented the 
first order condition for emissions is just (19) above.  Essentially, the two first order 
necessary conditions collapse to equation (13) defining the optimal tax, and equation (19) 
defining (efficient) provision of environmental policy.  The government never disturbs 
the marginal social benefit/cost rule for provision of emissions in order to manipulate the 
price of capital, and the capital supply.   
Importantly the result holds for all capital market structures and the optimal tax 
that goes with each.   For example, the optimal tax is equal to the marginal product of 
capital in the community when 0ε = .  If this capital market structure applies then as long 
as the government chooses a tax on capital consistent with *t r=  one can be sure that 
emissions are provided consistent with (19).  Similarly, when 0 ε< < ∞  then if the tax (or 
subsidy) satisfies (13), emissions are efficient.  Yet this is a clear case which diverges 
from the Oates and Schwab model since here the supply of capital to the economy is 
imperfectly elastic and the government has an incentive to use its policies to favorably 
influence its net capital price relative to the given world price.  But from Theorem 1 only 
the tax is used to manipulate the capital price and environmental policy remains 
undistorted.  Finally, if ε →∞  capital supply is perfectly elastic and * 0t → .  This is the 
Oates and Schwab result that when capital is perfectly mobile the optimal tax is zero.   
The Theorem and proof broaden the Oates and Schwab case to show that even 
when a community diverges from a zero tax policy to manipulate its own capital price, 
environmental policy is still efficient; the tax alone is assigned to the task of obtaining the 
most favorable capital price and environmental policy is undistorted.  
The following explanation for this preference to use the tax to manipulate the 
domestic capital price relative to the world price, rather than distort environmental policy, 
is offered.  The two fiscal instruments g and t are similar in terms of their impact on 
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capital price and supply with two differences.  First any change in emissions has a cost 
(or benefit) in terms of its direct impact on household welfare that the tax does not.  This 
arises because households’ care directly about emissions and g is an argument of the 
utility function.  Second changes in emissions have a direct effect on output and hence 
consumption that the tax does not.  This arises because g is an argument of the production 
function.  The implication is that a given change in emissions has marginal costs and 
benefits that exceed the marginal costs and benefits of a given change in the tax yet they 
have (almost) identical effects on the price of capital and its supply.  So it is always 
optimal for a welfare maximizing (and hence cost minimizing) government to vary the 
tax and not emissions to obtain its desired domestic capital price and supply.  
   
4.2 Single instrument (no capital tax) 
Now suppose that the community cannot levy the per unit capital tax and chooses only g  
to maximize per capita household utility subject to the capital market condition (5).  The 
net return to capital is ( , )x r k g=  and the first order condition for emissions becomes  
 gk g g
X
Ukr k f H r k
g U
∂
+ = − +
∂
      (20) 
The second term gf  on the left side is the social marginal benefit of emissions and the 
first term on the right is the social marginal cost, as shown in Theorem 1.  In an 
equilibrium satisfying (20) the outcome is inefficient since there is no longer an optimal 
tax to cancel the distorting terms present in (20), as occurs in Theorem 1 and its proof.   
 However, it is not possible to show whether environmental policy is under or over 
provided relative to levels consistent with the Samuelson condition.  This can be 
appreciated by noting that the marginal cost of emissions with no tax is higher than the 






H r k H
U U
− + > − .      (21) 
The marginal benefit of emissions with no tax is also higher than the marginal benefit 
with a tax, that is 
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 k g g





.       (22) 
Hence, the marginal cost and marginal benefit of emissions are both higher when the 
government has no tax instrument relative to the marginal costs and benefits when it does 
have the tax.  As a result, one cannot say in general whether environmental policy is 
under or over provided relative to socially optimal levels, only that it is inefficient. 
 A theorem on efficiency absent the capital tax is now stated without proof: 
 
Theorem 2: If the government has no tax on mobile capital then any choice of emissions 
consistent with the first order necessary condition (20) is in general inefficient.        
 
 When denied its lowest cost instrument for manipulating the domestic capital 
price relative to the fixed world price, the welfare maximizing government accepts some 
distortion to environmental policy to achieve its desired capital price.  It should also be 
noted here that environmental standards are inefficiently provided under all three capital 
market structures, including the Oates and Schwab case where *t →∞ , the domestic 
return approaches the given world return and capital is perfectly mobile.  
 
5. Two-states: Is there a race to the bottom? 
Suppose now that the community is one of two sub-national jurisdictions (or states) 
within a federation.  Each state provides environmental policy and sets a tax on capital.  
This extension allows one to say something about the environmental race to the bottom 
literature which argues that game playing states engaged in non-cooperative behavior 
degrade environmental standards to attract mobile capital, labor or firms.     
 The added complexity from this extension relates to the capital market.  In this 
respect, it is assumed that capital is perfectly mobile between states while the federation 
as a whole faces a capital supply analogous to (5).  Thus, capital flows without restriction 
within the federation in response to state policies (a common capital market) but capital 
supply to the federation is subject to potential imperfections.  The other assumptions for 
the single community model are assumed to hold for each state except that now all capital 
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is assumed to be foreign owned.  The analysis proceeds by assuming that state i is the 
decision-maker but the results apply whichever state has this role.     
 In view of this set up capital is assumed to move freely between states to satisfy  
 i jx x x= =         (23) 
where ( , )i i i i ix r k g t= −  is the net capital price in state i and jx  is the net capital price in 
state j.  In equilibrium both returns must be equal to the federation-wide net return x .  
 This no-arbitrage condition is often seen in models of federations with tax 
competition where some given supply of capital migrates freely across jurisdictions.  
However, consistent with the way in which capital supply to the single country was 
modeled above, here the total supply of capital K  to the federation is assumed to be a 
monotonically non-decreasing function of the federation-wide net price x.  From (23) the 
equal net return x is also the net return in state i so one can define the total supply of 
capital to the federation as a non-decreasing function of the net return in state i alone  
 ( )i j iK k k K x= + =        (24)  
 As in the single economy case capital supply can be perfectly inelastic (vertical 
supply curve), non-decreasing in the federation-wide return or perfectly elastic.  There 
are now two capital market equilibrium conditions but they can be collapsed into one 
condition by rewriting (24) as ( )j i ik K x k= −  and using this in (23) to obtain   
 
 
ri (ki ,gi ) − ti = rj (K(xi ) − ki ,g j ) − t j .     (25) 
The utility of a household in state j is  
 
( , )
,i i i i i i
i





.      (26) 
 The combined equilibrium condition (25) implies that the choice of emissions in 
state i influences its own supply of capital, but also the capital supply to the federation 
through its effect on the gross return to capital in state i.  Since the welfare of households 
in state j depends on the total supply of capital to the federation the emissions choice of 
state i influences welfare in state j and vice versa.  By the same logic the tax choice made 
by state i affects welfare in state j and vice versa.  Hence, the problem is considered to be 
a non-cooperative game.  With Nash conjectures a state chooses its policies conditional 
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on the choices of its neighbor to maximize the utility of a representative household.  The 
first order necessary conditions are identical to (11) and (16) respectively.   
 However, the capital supply responses are more complex since they now account 
for the migration of capital between states as well as the (imperfect) migration of capital 
in (and out) of the federation.  Nevertheless it can be shown10 that the relationship 
identified at (17) for the single community also applies to states in a federation, that is,   







.       (27) 
 As in the single community model this can be used to show that the first order 
necessary condition for emissions in state i collapses to a Samuelson condition.  If the 
state uses its tax optimally the distorting terms that would otherwise affect provision of 
environmental standards cancel and the ‘efficient emissions’ result applies to states in a 
federation.11  Hence, if a community chooses efficient emissions as an autonomous 
decision-maker so too will a community within a federation.  It can also be shown that if 
the state does not have access to a capital tax only then will it engage in inefficient 
provision of environmental standards (as in the single country case).  Also, as shown for 
the single community case the efficiency results hold for all types of capital market 
assumptions.  Unlike the common finding in the race to the bottom literature, in the 
model developed here deviations from efficient behavior only emerge when one restricts 
the policy set to exclude the capital tax.  Otherwise there is no ‘race’.     
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined whether communities, acting autonomously or as sub-national 
jurisdictions within federations, distort environmental policy to manipulate their capital 
terms of trade.  The model adopted is similar to Oates and Schwab with one main 
difference; the supply of capital to the community is not perfectly elastic.  Rather, capital 
supply is (i) perfectly inelastic; (ii) a non-decreasing function of the domestic capital 
price relative to the given outside (world) price or (iii) perfectly elastic. 
                                               
10 The derivation of (27) for the two-state case is available on request. 
11 A formal demonstration of this is available on request. 
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 This feature of the model, and in particular (ii) above, endows a community with 
an incentive to use its policies to influence its capital price.  The paper shows that if the 
community does not have a capital tax then it will distort environmental policy to take 
advantage of this opportunity.  Hence, capital market imperfections can lead to 
distortions in environmental policy.  This result is very much in keeping with the flavor 
of the findings in the race to the bottom literature, namely, that capital mobility entices 
communities to adopt inefficient environmental policies in exchange for some other 
benefit, such as a more favorable domestic capital price.    
 The contribution of the paper is to show that such inefficiency never eventuates if 
the community, whether acting alone, or as part of a federation, has a policy vector that 
includes a capital tax.  In this instance it always prefers to use the tax to manipulate its 
capital price, rather than distort environmental policy.  This is because the cost-benefit 
calculus associated with using the tax to manipulate the domestic capital price is more 
favorable.  The results challenge the race to the bottom (or top) idea, at least when the 
desire to distort policies arises from capital market imperfections.  The paper also 
highlights that inefficient outcomes are only obtained when capital markets are imperfect 
if the strategy set is restricted to exclude the capital tax.  It is this restriction that creates 
inefficient standards rather than the presence of non-cooperative game playing between 
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